



# Issue Paper

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## Review of Reserve Component Portrayal in Army War Games and Exercises

By COL Jeffrey C. Reynolds, LTC (P) John C. Traylor, LTC (P) Thomas Murray and Prof. James O. Kievit

In September 2002 the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) embarked on a series of workshops and seminars designed to ensure the realistic portrayal of the Reserve Components (RC) in Army War College and Army exercises and to further the understanding of RC issues within the curriculum of the Army War College.



The Global War on Terrorism and the recent war in Iraq have led to an increased use of the Reserve Components to meet operational requirements and make it imperative that the reserve component utilization and capabilities are clearly understood by our future leaders. Equally important is a need to address RC roles, missions, capabilities and employment in the context of military transformation and homeland security in the new security environment. The once sacrosanct paradigm of the Abrams Doctrine, or Total Force

Policy, is now being questioned. The resulting debate will lead to decisions that will impact all components of the Army.

### PURPOSE

The Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership hosted 54 participants at a workshop conducted May 21-22, 2003 at the Collins Center, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania and examined the portrayal of reserve component forces in the recently concluded Strategic Crisis Exercise, Joint Land, Aerospace, and Sea Simulation, and Unified Quest 2003.

Conference attendees included members of the Active Army, Army Reserve, and the Army and Air National Guard as well as civilian representatives from a variety of Department of Defense (DOD) organizations. Participants included National Guard (NG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) general officers, representatives of the Joint Staff, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), National



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Defense University (NDU), National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the Office of the Chief Army Reserve (OCAR).

NG and USAR subject matter experts provided component updates, and participant workshop groups examined RC issues in each of the three subject exercises. Breakout groups shared their findings with all participants in a concluding plenary session.

## **STRATEGIC CRISIS EXERCISE**

The Strategic Crisis Exercise (SCE) is designed to integrate and apply student-acquired knowledge in the pursuit of strategic and operational art within the framework of Crisis Action Planning and execution. The March 2003 SCE provided a more realistic RC depiction for both expeditionary crises and homeland security (HLS) response scenarios as compared to prior years. Mobilization decision approval time delays for units were realistic; however, most felt this was by exercise design and not a result of student decision-making. The requirement for ad hoc Derivative Unit Identification Code (DUIC) packages was accomplished with great effort by the SCE automated process; however, the students did not learn the DUIC force package details. Suggestions for improved portrayal of reserve component use in HLS from the previous SCE were incorporated.<sup>1</sup> Recommendations to further improve RC portrayal in the SCE include:

- Incorporate the decision points for Combatant Commanders and Force Providers to determine unit readiness for mobilization via C-ratings.
- Increase student visibility of all forces available and committed, to include NG units on State Active Duty (SAD) and in Title 32 statuses. One possibility would have the NGB/OCAR lower control cells generate daily situation reports.
- Increase non-DOD participation. For example, use Department of Homeland Security employees in HLS agency higher and lower control roles.
- Seek greater participation of senior level state government officials in SCE.
- Apportion single units to multiple CONPLANS (“dual apportionment”) to add realistic competition for resources.
- Develop a table that identifies unit mobilization timeframes for variable missions such as SAD, mobilization for HLD/HLS, and expeditionary low and high intensity combat.
- Incorporate a greater degree of post-conflict resolution, stabilization missions, and demobilization into play.

## **JOINT LAND, AEROSPACE AND SEA SIMULATION EXERCISE**

The Joint Land, Aerospace and Sea Simulation (JLASS) serves as a practicum in the design and execution of theater level campaign planning. Its purpose is to enhance Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) by addressing key issues at the strategic and operational levels of war; to expand awareness of Combined/Joint Staff operations and Unified Command issues; and to prepare joint warfighters. Recommendations to improve future JLASS exercises include:

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<sup>1</sup> SCE-2003 was conducted at the onset of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and HLS play was impacted by the absence of previously scheduled Observer/Controllers from the various federal agencies.

- Reinforce RC issues within learning objectives across the senior-level military colleges.
- Establish contacts at Joint Forces Command, NORTHCOM, NGB, OCAR, and Joint Staff Reserve Affairs to represent RC issues in JЛАSS.
- Present RC workshop findings at JЛАSS Steering Group meetings for consideration for inclusion in JЛАSS course and exercise.<sup>2</sup>

## UNIFIED QUEST (UQ)

UQ 2003 was a joint war game that explored military transformation issues in a joint environment with multinational forces/players and metrics to aid concept experimentation. Specific 2003 objectives were to explore integrated global operations, joint concept integration, joint effects generation, and alternative battle command echelonment options. Seminar participants felt that the May 2003 UQ revealed that both the RC portrayal and HLS need further integration into future game objectives, and that RC portrayal in UQ is principally a function of the pre-game design as well as the analytical endeavors during pre-game planning and preparatory workshops. Furthermore, UQ planners they felt that the UQ game design couldn't address HLS in sufficient detail while simultaneously working the other transformational concept details. Recommendations for UQ are to:

- Incorporate proper depiction of RC roles, missions and operations into future UQ game objectives.
- Identify additional RC subject matter experts to participate in the UQ pre-game design, planning, and preparatory workshops.
- Address the overarching issues related to NG and USAR employment.
- Identify a lead DOD agent to recruit appropriate federal, state, local, and non-governmental exercise participants for UQ exercises.
- Consider cooperative efforts with state authorities for a UQ homeland security exercise as a possible venue to assist the state-level HLS exercises expected to emerge in the future.

## RC ISSUES FOR FUTURE WORKSHOPS

Workshop participants identified the following as the most critical issues for further study at future workshops:

- Command and control in complex domestic contingencies (SAD, Title 32, and Title 10).
- Interrelationships between the Abrams Doctrine and Army Transformation and the associated implications for total army force structure and sizing.
- Interoperability of active and RC units across a wide spectrum, to include communications, training, logistics, maintenance and equipment.
- Mobilization readiness--getting the RC into the fight faster and easier with "Just-in-Time" mobilization.
- AC/RC mix and dual missioning for overseas warfighting and HLS.

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<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that workshop participants also felt that these same three recommendations apply specifically to the portrayal of overall HLS activities in JЛАSS.

- Strategic reserve apportionment and allocation.
- RC involvement in post-conflict stabilization operations.
- Proper placement of RC instruction and students throughout the JPME system.

## CONCLUSION

Current military capabilities continue to be stretched as recent requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate--the Reserve Components are increasingly essential elements of total U.S. military power. Transformation and homeland security will each likely force changes in the Army. However, not all of those may be immediately compatible. Army leadership must account for these competing changes and work with DOD and the Congress to create a future Army capable of strategic mobility and decisive victory overseas while conducting homeland defense and civil support operations.

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# RESERVE COMPONENT PORTRAYAL IN ARMY WAR GAMES

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Carlisle, PA 17103-5049

650 Wright Avenue

Center for Strategic Leadership

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE